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CASE COMMENTS
against the insurance company becomes undesirable in such a case.
A comparison of the "third solution," as expounded in the Juzef-
ski case, with the "fourth solution," as recommended by the dissent in
Sperling, will reveal that the "fourth solution" is the more logical of
the two. The court in the Juzefski case did not look beyond the ap-
parent ambiguity. If it had it would have found that there was only
one reasonable construction of the contrict. If one looks not only at
the words but also at the normal implications that flow therefrom,
it is easily seen that "his household" means the familial or residential
group with which one lives. A wife or son who lives under the parent-
al roof has a household.30 To adopt the construction of the court
would, in effect, construe out of existence the exclusion clause in the
policy, for Keys was not the head of any household. In the words of the
dissenting judge in the Juzefski case: "I think it incorrect to find am-
biguity by the process of suggesting a strained and quite unnatural in-
terpretation as a basis of possible conflict." 31
Therefore, solutions one and three appear to reject the rule of rea-
sonable construction and refuse to ascertain the intention of the parties
if any interpretation of the words results in a finding of liability
against the insurance company. Reasonableness is no longer a cri-
terion in determining the intention of the parties because this intent
is no longer a primary consideration, except as expressed in the
words which are construed most strongly against the insurer. The
undesirability of this change in insurance law becomes apparent from
the fact that insurance companies are found liable in situations when
the parties to the contract had not even remotely intended such lia-
bility. The court in such a case gives the insured greater protection
than he paid for.
THOMAS W. KROEiZ
APPELLATE REVIEW OF JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
As a result of a statutory and judicial relaxation of procedural
rules, courts in most states now have power to make post-verdict dis-
='Farn Bureau Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v. Violano, 123 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1941).
"342 P.2d at 933. "Words should be taken in that sense to which the apparent
object and intention of the parties limit them, and the courts will always look
behind the terminology to ascertain what the parties intended in making the
contract." i Couch, Insurance § 15:22 (2d ed. 1959). In the light of this statement
and the Lott and Habaz cases, the fallacy of the court's decision in the Sperling
case becomes apparent.
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positions of cases by entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict.'
In some of these states, lawmakers have provided for the possibility of
a disagreement of the jurors by authorizing the entry of judgment in
that event also.2 But when a trial court first denies motions for a
directed verdict, and later enters judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict-the same evidence forming the basis for both determinations, a
reviewing court may become somewhat dubious of the propriety of the
trial court's entry of judgment.
The recent Ohio case of Perko v. Local 207 of Int'l Ass'n of Bridge
Workers3 presented this situation under a statute which provides for
the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict or upon disagree-
ment of the jury. The statute authorizes judgment when a party is en-
titled thereto as a matter of law upon the pleadings or the evidence
received on trial, but not on the ground that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence. 4 The case involved an alleged interference
by the defendant with the plaintiff's right to work. During the trial, the
defendant's motions for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's
evidence and again at the close of all the evidence were denied, and the
case was submitted to the jury. Its members were unable to reach an
agreement on a verdict, and the jury was discharged. Thereupon, the
defendant filed a "motion for judgment on disagreement of jury"
under the Ohio statute5 upon the ground that it was entitled by
law to judgment upon the evidence received during the trial. The trial
court granted this motion but rendered no opinion as to the basis
for its action. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
'E.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 684 (1953); Va. Code Ann. § 8-352 (1950). For a col-
lection of cases arising under Rule 5o(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
like state statutes, see Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 449 (196o).
-'The authorities are not in agreement as to the trial court's power to enter
judgment after a disagreement of the jury when the statute only authorizes the
entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Compare, Domarek v. Bates Motor
Transp. Lines, Inc., 93 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1937) (holding that the court had such
power), with Brandsrud v. Beattie Steinborn Co., 74 S.D. 224, 50 N.W.2d 639 (1951)
(holding that the statute authorizing judgment notwithstanding the verdict inap-
plicable when no verdict is returned). For a collection of cases involving the entry
of judgment after a disagreement of the jury, see Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 885 (1953).
317, Ohio St. 68, 167 N.E.2d 93 (1960).
4Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2323.18 (Baldwin, Supp. 196o): "When upon the state-
ments in the pleadings or upon the evidence received upon the trial, or both, one
party is entitled by law to judgment in his favor, upon motion of such party ...
judgment shall be so rendered by the court although the jury may have failed
to reach a verdict or a verdict has been rendered against such party and a judgment
entered thereon, and whether or not a motion to direct a verdict has been made or
overruled, but no judgment shall be rendered by the court on the ground that the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence."
sIbid.
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judgment, stating that "the court, after careful consideration of
the entire record finds that plaintiff, appellant has not sustained the
burden of proof .... 6
In a four to three decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed
the judgment of the lower courts and remanded the case for a new
trial. From the opinion it appears that the Supreme Court did not con-
sider whether there was evidence in the record to support the plain-
tiff's cause, but instead relied on two inferences drawn from the ac-
tion of the lower courts. The first inference was that the trial court did
not intend its entry of judgment for the defendant to mean that there
was no evidence to support plaintiff's case, for if it had, it would have
granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The second in-
ference was that the intermediate appellate court in affirming the
trial court's judgment realized that the evidence had been weighed;
this inference arose from the opinion of the intermediate appellate
court which stated that the plaintiff had failed to sustain the burden
of proof. On the strength of these two inferences, the Supreme Court
concluded that the trial court had weighed the evidence in reaching
its decision to enter judgment for the defendant. Since the statute
expressly denies the trial court power to weigh the evidence in con-
sidering a motion for judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict, by
analogy the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court should not
have this power where the jury reached no verdict because of a dis-
agreement.
The statute which authorizes the entry of "judgment notwith-
standing" represents a departure from the common law rules in that
it authorizes the court to make a post-verdict final determination of
a case upon the basis of evidence received at the trial,7 while at
common law a post-verdict final determination could be made only on
the basis of the pleadings.8 Also, the common law only permits the
"167 N.E.2d at 904.
7See note 4 supra.
Referring to the federal rule, it has been said: "The rule does not have the
effect of narrowing or'restricting the exclusive providence of the jury to determine
queitons of fact. A motion under the rule can be granted only where the moving party
was entitled to a directed verdict. If there were contested issues of fact appropriate
for submission to the jury, it is error to grant a motion for judgment under the
rule." Brodrick v. Derby, 236 F.2d 35, 37 (soth Cir. 1956), citing Berry v. United
States, 312 U.S. 450 (1941).
'Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 380-82 (1913). But see Baltimore
& Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935), wherein it was held that the
court could reserve its ruling on a motion for a directed verdict until after the
verdict, at which time it could make its ruling and enter judgment thereon not-
withstanding the verdict.
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court to direct a verdict against a party who on trial fails to pro-
duce sufficient evidence to go to the jury,9 but the statute extends
this rule by authorizing such a determination after a verdict or dis-
agreement of the jury.10 In effect, the statute allows the test for a
directed verdict to be applied at the time of the post-verdict motion."
Thus a peculiar situation occurs when a trial court, after denying
motions for a directed verdict, subsequently enters "judgment not-
withstanding" when the same evidence forms the basis for determina-
tion on both motions.12 It was this situation in the Perko case that gave
rise to the inference that the trial court's action was improper.
Approaching the problem from the standpoint of the Ohio Su-
preme Court, a possible inference would be that the trial court, in
denying the motion for a directed verdict, believed that a prima
facie case'3 had been established by the plaintiff. Thus the trial court
would not have been authorized to enter a judgment for the de-
fendant.' 4 But the situation may have been such that the trial court
was undecided as to whether a prima facie case had been established,
and desiring additional time to re-examine the record,' 5 submitted
the case to the jury subject to its prerogative of later entering "judg-
ment notwithstanding." In the absence of evidence to the contrary
it would seem that the second inference is the more proper of the
two, in that if the first inference were correct, it would follow that the
trial judge knowingly violated the statute.
Courts with rules similar to the Ohio statute take the view that in
such a case the better practice is for the trial court to submit the case
9A final determination in this sense does not include the granting of a motion
for a new trial. See, 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2495 (3 d ed. 194o).
"°See note 4 supra.
"Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 US. 243 (194o); Ayers v. Woodard,
166 Ohio St. 138, 14o N.E.2d 4o (1957).
UAs to whether the court is required to consider the record as of the time of
the motion for judgment under the rule or at the time of the prior motion for a di-
rected verdict, compare In re Bingaman's Estate, 155 Neb. 24, 5o N-W.2d 523 (1951),.
with Weber v. United Hardware & Implement Mutuals Co., 75 N.D. 581, 31 N.W.2d
456 (1948).
"The term prima fade case is employed herein as "representing the stage ...
where the proponent, having the first duty of producing some evidence in order to
pass the judge to the jury, has fullfilled that duty, satisfied the judge, and may prop-
erly claim that the jury be allowed to consider his case." 9 Wigmore, Evidence §
2494 (3 d ed. 194o).
"4See note 7 supra.
"'"This procedure permits the trial judge to give further consideration to a
difficult question after the verdict and after having been obliged to give a quick
decision, under the pressure of the waiting jury .... " Herrmann, The New Rules of
Procedure in Delaware, i8 F.R.D. 327, 340-41 (1956).
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to the jury for its voluntary finding.16 If a motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict is granted after the jury returns its verdict,
a new trial may be avoided inasmuch as the appellate court, if it dis-
agrees with the trial court, can direct the trial court to reinstate the
verdict and enter judgment thereon.' 7 It does not appear that the
propriety of this practice should be affected by the subsequent failure
of the jury to reach a verdict.
The second inference relied upon by the Supreme Court arose
from the intermediate court's opinion which stated that the plain-
tiff had failed to sustain the burden of proof. The intermediate
court's opinion is itself ambiguous due to the dual meaning of the
term "burden of proof."'s Burden of proof in one sense deals with
the risk of non-persuasion of the jury,' 9 while in the other sense
it deals with the burden of satisfying the judge that there is a triable
issue for the jury.20 The opinion, under the first meaning of burden
of proof, could mean that the intermediate court felt that there was
sufficient evidence upon the record to establish a prima facie case in
favor of the plaintiff. In such a case the trial court would not be auth-
orized to enter "judgment notwithstanding" since this would neces-
sitate weighing the evidence.21 The opinion, under the other mean-
ing of burden of proof, could mean that the evidence upon the record
failed to show that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case.
In this case the trial court would be authorized to enter "judg-
ment notwithstanding."22
The ambiguity of the intermediate court's opinion accentuates the
question of whether the opinion should constitute a part of the
basis for determination by the Supreme Court, since it is generally
IShaw v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 249 F.2d 434 (7 th Cir. 1957); Craighead v.
Missouri Pac. Transp. Co., 195 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1952); Fratta v. Grace Line, Inc.,
t39 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1943.)
"Ibid. See Phelps, Reinstatement of a Verdict in Ohio, io U. Cinc. L. Rev. 481
(1936).
ThWigmore sets out two clearly distinguishable meaning of "burden of proof":
(i) Risk of Non-Persuasion of the Jury. This concept suggests that a triable issue
has been established, and involves the duty upon the respective parties of adducing
evidence to persuade the jury in its finding. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2485 (3d ed.
1940).
(2) Duty of Producing Evidence to the Judge. This concept involves the duty of
both parties to "satisfy the judge that they have a quantity of evidence fit to be
considered by the jury, and to form a reasonable basis for the verdict." 9 Wig-
more, Evidence § 2487 (3d ed. 1940).
11Id. § 2485-
21Id. § 2487.
'See note 4 supra.
=Ibid.
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held that a reviewing court is restricted to the record in making its
determination. 23 The usual rule, which can be traced back to the
1827 United States Supreme Court case of Williams v. Norris,24 is that
the opinion of a lower court is not a part of the record.25 The Court in
the Williams case refused to decide the case on legal questions arising
from the opinion of the lower court which did not appear in the
record. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated:
"[I]t [the opinion of the lower court] can be introduced for no
other purpose than to suggest to the superior court those
arguments which might otherwise escape its notice, which
operated in producing the judgment, and which ... ought to
be weighed by the superior court before the judgment should
be reversed or affirmed." 26
If the sole function of the lower court's opinion upon review is to
suggest arguments to the higher court, it would be wholly inconsist-
ent to allow this opinion to form a part of the basis for the de-
termination by the appellate court.
In substantiating the holding of the Williams case, the Chief
Justice set forth the proposition to which the courts generally ad-
here, that "if it [the judgment of the lower court] should be correct,
although the reasoning by which the mind of the judge was con-
ducted to it should be deemed unsound, that judgment would cer-
tainly be affirmed in the superior court."21 In other words, if the
statement of the opinion or some other action of the lower court
shows an improper application of the law, it is incumbent upon the
reviewing court to ascertain whether the judgment could be affirmed
under a proper application of the law. Thus in the Perko case, the
Supreme Court should not have reached a decision opposing that of
the lower courts merely from a determination that the reason for the
lower courts' decisions was erroneous; its duty was to ascertain whether
the judgment of the lower courts could legally be based on the facts
of the case and the law applicable thereto.
nKlager v. Murphy Alfalfa, Inc., 165 Kan. 130, 193 P.2d 216 (1948); Loth v.
Loth, 227 Minn. 387, 35 N.W.2d 542 (1949); Schubert v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 358
Mo. 303, 214 S.W.2d 420 (1948); Kennedy & Parsons Co. v. Schmidt, 152 Neb. 637,
42 N.W.2d 191 (1950); Kontwer v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 148
Ohio St. 614, 76 N.E.2d 611 (1947); New Bay Shore Corp. v. Lewis, 193 Va. 400,
69 S.E.2d 320 (1952).
2'25 US. (12 Wheat.) 117 (1827).
2 Accord, Wilson v. Wilson, 64 Cal. 92, 27 Pac. 861 (1883); Pennsylvania Co. v.
Versten, 140 Ill. 637, 30 N.E. 540 (1892); State v. Central Pac. R.R., 17 Nev. 259,
30 Pac. 887 (1883); Buckley v. Duff, iLii Pa. 223, 3 Ati. 823 (1886).
'425 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 119-20.
2Id. at 120.
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"It is of the first importance to assure so far as possible an ob-
jective and impartial determination of the facts involved in a contro-
versy, and of the law to be applied to those facts. '28 This determina-
tion serves not only as a check on the judiciary but also as a basis of
decisions by the courts in other cases according to the "common law
technique of decisions and doctrine of precedents." 29 To this extent
the parties and the court alike have an interest in the treatment of
a case on review. Even if the record is inadequate to affirm or re-
verse the lower court's holding, due consideration should be given
to the fact that much of what is important in arriving at a determina-
tion of the facts by the trial court is lost to a reviewing court in tran-
scribing oral testimony.
30
It is felt that the rule authorizing the entry of "judgment not-
withstanding" has been successful because the judge making the
initial determination is present during the trial and is able to get
the "feel" of the case, and so he is better qualified to make a ruling.3 '
The purpose of the rule is to speed up litigation by preventing
unnecessary retrials.32
However, if any doubt is permitted to surround the appellate
review of the use of this rule, then trial judges will be faced with a
dilemma. They may choose to direct a verdict and risk having the
decision reversed on appeal after which a new trial is necessary; or
they may find that the failure to direct a verdict has cast doubt upon
the propriety of a subsequent "judgment notwithstanding." There-
fore, appellate courts should provide clear and logical rules for the
review of the "judgment notwithstanding"; otherwise the benefit in-
tended by the rule may never be realized.
MACON C. PUTNEY
23Pound, Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases 3 (1941).
2Id. at 4.
'OId. at 6.
"1Cone v. West Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 216 (1947).
2Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 250 (194o). "The limitation of
this common-law procedure was thought to be unjust because it sometimes coerced
the losing party to compromise or abandon legal rights involved in the case or
suffer the delay, expense, and effort of another trial upon what frequently proved to
be substantially the same evidence." Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 151 Neb.
663, 38 N.W.2d 533, 535 (1949)-
